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Paved with Good Intentions: 
   The Realities of “Safe” 
      Versus “Free”
by Roger Hess [ Golden West Humanitarian Foundation ]
Government-initiated landmine and unexploded-ordnance clearance policies often dictate unrealistic 
standards and goals that differ from the practical reality of landmine/UXO removal. The author argues 
that end use of the land, as well as the variables of munitions deterioration due to aging and environ-
ment, and the level of expected risk should be considered in landmine/UXO policy-making.
From a global perspective you will find that much of Western Europe has not reached the same standards expected of those countries that have experienced 
wars in the last 20 years, such as Afghanistan, Angola, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, and Iraq. Explo-
sive ordnance, chemical munitions and other hazardous 
remnants from World War I and World War II are still com-
monly found during construction and rebuilding in Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Many of 
these items remain very active and highly dangerous, but the 
risk level is anticipated, managed and dealt with accordingly. 
For countries recovering from more recent conflicts, the sig-
nificant difference is in the way the threat is managed and ad-
dressed and how clearance standards are set.
So with this in mind, why are newer post-war environ-
ments held to standards that have not been achieved in some 
of the most developed countries in the world? Let us consid-
er a more realistic approach to clearance standards involving 
risk mitigation.
Policies versus Practicality
Compared to how we went about our tasks 15 years ago, the 
landmine and UXO clearance field has matured a great deal. 
Unfortunately, the same cannot always be said for the policies 
governing some landmine/UXO clearance efforts. Like many 
in our field, I have often been placed in situations where I was 
expected to meet unrealistic standards and goals because pol-
icy requirements were at odds with the level of threat. Using 
an example later in this article, I will explain how this situa-
tion occurred while we were working in Quang Tri province 
in Vietnam. In situations where policies and threat level are 
at odds, it is challenging to explain why unrealistic standards 
and goals are, in fact, a waste of time, money and resources.
I have encountered a few common unrealistic standards 
over the years, including: “The country must be made land-
mine/UXO-free” and to a lesser extent, “The entire site must 
be cleared of all landmine/UXO to a depth of five, 10 or even 
15 meters (16–49 feet).” Such unrealistic expectations have 
resulted in some of the most heavily debated topics of our 
profession and have normally been generated from a policy 
established at the governmental or geopolitical levels. These 
policies are generally written on principles that may have 
seemed logical at their inception but are not always reviewed 
for practicality as time goes on.
Senior politicians developed and/or put in place some of 
these policies, thereby making the nation as a whole bound to 
implement them. While a few countries, such as Costa Rica 
and Macedonia, were fortunate enough to have conditions 
where landmine/UXO-free status was achievable, for most 
countries this goal is nearly impossible.
Landmine/UXO contamination that presents a direct 
threat to the public or impedes development must be cleared; 
this is without question. Not everyone agrees, however, that 
land that does not directly threaten the public or immediately 
stop development does not require clearance (See Tamar Ga-
belnick’s editorial on page 5). There are far more cost- and 
time-effective methods to manage the risk in these areas with-
out compromising safety.
Without delving into the different techniques involved 
with clearing each type of threat, the key issue is freedom of 
movement. Clearing shallow-laid landmines to create free ac-
cess over a contaminated area results in very little freedom of 
movement, because a missed signal can kill or seriously injure 
the operator or his/her team members, as well as anyone who 
subsequently uses the land. Clearing buried UXO allows far 
more freedom of movement but requires a search method that 
goes much deeper. A missed signal is un-
likely to kill the clearance team, howev-
er, the people occupying and developing 
the land afterward may not be so lucky. 
Either way, it should be acknowl-
edged that the threat from an explosive-
filled munition—a landmine, cluster 
munition, hand grenade, mortar, etc.—
is still an explosive threat. Wars happen, 
and since the invention of the cannon 
ball, hazardous items remain. After the 
war ends, rebuilding must occur, and the 
remaining hazards must be managed.
Assessing and Managing the Risk
In Europe, a significant amount of 
buried munitions remain. In the case of 
the U.K. more deeply buried munitions 
are likely larger aircraft bombs dropped 
by the Luftwaffe. In much of the rest 
of Western Europe, smaller munitions 
such as landmines, artillery, mortars, 
grenades, cluster munitions and other 
aircraft bombs persist in the ground.  
The good news is that since many 
smaller UXO in Europe are deeply bur-
ied, it is feasible for pedestrians and ve-
hicles to pass over them without causing 
detonation. If this UXO you drove over 
had detonated, you probably would not 
even have known it unless you had seis-
mic instruments already in position. 
The detonation of a high-explosive com-
pound creates a shock wave and rapidly 
expanding gases. However, this power is 
finite, and any surrounding matter, such 
as compacted earth, directly affect the 
explosion impact. 
How Deep is Deep Enough?
Calculating the factors required to 
nullify the effects of an underground 
detonation requires consideration of 
several variables such as the quantity 
and depth of the explosive and soil type. 
These calculations can be done using 
specialized software programs. The best 
program I have seen to date is the Con-
ventional Weapons Effects Program 
(CONWEP); the current Windows®-
based version (2.1.0.8) is restricted due 
to its new features, but many people 
still have access to the older DOS-based 
program. 
The Russian PMN-2 anti-personnel 
mine is one of the most common AP 
mines worldwide and is provided as an 
example. It contains a 108-gram main 
charge of a compound named TG-40, 
which is fairly close to U.S.-made Com-
position B explosives. Using the unclas-
sified CONWEP cratering profiles with 
a dry, sandy clay environment at 0 cen-
timeters, the apparent crater will be 15 
cm. (6 inches) deep, and window break-
age can be expected at nearly 25 meters 
(82 feet). 
When buried to 58 cm. (23 in.) in 
the same environment, the blast goes 
to null and has no noticeable effects. If 
it is buried 57.5 cm. (22.6 in.), the ap-
parent crater is only 2.6 millimeters 
(0.10 in.) deep, and window breakage 
is down to 23 cm. (9 in.) away (see Fig-
ure 1 above). Essentially, if you wear a 
decent set of shoes when walking over 
a PMN-2 at this depth and it does deto-
nate, you might need to touch up your 
shoe polish. The more we tested the 
CONWEP predictions against various 
situations, the more accurate we found 
the predictions. 
The CONWEP program was useful, 
for example, when we worked a 27-hect-
are (67 acres) clearance program for a 
development project in Vietnam at 
Vung Ha, which is south of Dong Ha 
in Quang Tri province. We were fortu-
nate enough to have an overview of the 
development plans that called for no 
excavation around the site once it was 
cleared and indicated that between 1.4 
and 4.0 m. (4.59–13.12 ft.) of soil would 
be deposited on top of the area when 
handed over. However, the national 
policy directed: “All landmine/UXO 
would be cleared to a depth of -5.0 m. 
[-16 ft.],” which is what we were asked to 
accomplish. This included cluster mu-
nitions or any other item that might be 
at this depth.
As part of the research and develop-
ment program linked with this clear-
ance (funded by the U.S. Department 
of Defense’s Humanitarian Demining 
R&D Program), we conducted numer-
ous tests with the detection equipment 
and established a quality-control lane 
with identical free-from-explosive mu-
nitions buried at the maximum depths 
Figure 1. Extract from CONWEP showing depth and the soil type required to nullify a 
detonation’s effects.
All graphics courtesy of the author.
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where they could be reliably located. The 
QC lane was used to test the detectors 
on a daily basis and the provincial au-
thorities assessed it with their own de-
tection equipment, agreeing that it was 
very realistic.
Using the development plan, we plot-
ted what size munition could break the 
surface after the site was backfilled. The 
smallest item that would create a surface 
threat after the topsoil was added would 
be a 155-mm. projectile buried 60 cm. 
(24 in.) under the existing surface (see 
Figure 2 above). This munition weighs 
42 kilograms (93 pounds) and contains 
almost 7.0 kg. (15 lb.) of explosive that 
equates to about 35 kg. (77 lb.) of steel.
When de-tuning our detection in-
struments to locate the 155-mm shell 
at this depth we could still reliably find 
larger items such as 250-lb. (113-kg.) 
bombs while tuning out the smaller 
items that would not pose a threat once 
the site was developed. The authori-
ties agreed to this in principle but were 
bound to adhere to the national policy.
If the team could have used the ad-
justed parameters, it would have al-
lowed the handover within a matter of 
45–60 days. However, the national pol-
icy was followed, and the parameters 
expanded for smaller munitions. The 
clearance began 4 June 2008, and the 
land was handed over eight months later 
on 30 January 2009.
Figure 3 below shows only the south 
side of the project; the black dots show 
all of the targets investigated in accor-
dance with the national standards. The 
blue dots are the large munitions that 
would have posed a hazard once the site 
was developed as specified in the plans.
The potential time and money that 
could have been saved on this site with-
out any risk to the end user is obvious. 
Had proper planning and risk-manage-
ment methods been allowed taking into 
consideration the land's end, the savings 
in money, manpower and effort could 
have been applied to other high-risk pri-
ority sites.  
In November 2009, I gave a presen-
tation in Vietnam outlining the rele-
vant issues for planning a project which 
would substantially accelerate the clear-
ance rates. It was attended by members 
from the country’s Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Planning and Investment, 
along with the People’s Committee and 
Ministry of Defense. The briefing in-
cluded a video of a 155-gram (4-ounce) 
charge buried 80 cm. (32 in.) deep and 
then detonated as I stood a few meters 
from it. If this charge was on the surface, 
I would likely have been seriously in-
jured or killed, but I barely had a layer of 
dust on my shoulders. While this enter-
tained the audience, unfortunately the 
individuals in positions to change the 
policies (Finance and Planning Min-
istries) did not understand the point I 
tried to make. 
This raises two questions about some 
of the policies governing our actions:
•	 If a hazard is in a position or lo-
cation unlikely to hurt anyone, 
why is time and money spent 
trying to remove it when other 
more pressing, life-threatening 
hazards are present?
•	 If a buried munition detonates 
undetected, what makes it a risk?
The popular stance of “Because it is 
there and could kill someone if the con-
ditions are just right” is not a justifiable 
answer. The question should be: “Is it 
presenting a clear threat to the population, or is it in a posi-
tion likely to present a valid threat?”
It is true, however, that previously cleared land may not al-
ways stay clear due to environmental factors. Flood waters can 
redistribute landmines and UXO the same way rocks and oth-
er debris are moved. Erosion can expose deeply buried items 
that were beyond the reach of detector systems used at the 
time of clearance, so what may have been considered “cleared 
to standards” at one time, may reveal hazardous items when 
the topsoil shifts. In addition, construction can expose buried 
UXO if the construction project’s scope of work is not known 
at the time of clearance. Often, clearance is requested for an 
area with rolling hills and valleys that upon completion will 
be used for development. The clearance team can only work 
from the surface that is present at the time and search as deep 
as the capability of their detectors. So without knowing the 
detailed development plan, time and money is wasted, and 
safety is not always assured for those who follow (see Figures 
4 and 5 above).
When turned over to construction crews, the hills are 
often leveled out to backfill the valleys and make a f lat sur-
face for building. The clearance effort has now been wasted 
in two ways:
•	 The time spent searching for small, subsurface mu-
nitions in the valley was pointless. It is now under a 
soil level in which only very large munitions would be 
able to create a hazard.
•	 Larger munitions located beyond the detectors’ limi-
tations posed no surface threat at the time of clear-
ance. Once construction crews level out the hills, 
however, the previous clearance depth is exceeded, 
and items may now be at a position where they pres-
ent a substantial surface hazard. 
Flood conditions can also place landmines/UXO at a depth 
that is no longer hazardous, which was the case during the 
clearance of Vung Ha. This area typically floods on an annual 
basis with 5–30 cm. (1.97–11.81 in.) of silt deposited each year, 
depending on how high the flood waters rise. The battles end-
ed at this site more than 30 years ago. This gives a perspective 
on how deep the munitions are now.
From an R&D perspective, Vung Ha received an unex-
pected benefit as it effectively proved how deep the detection 
systems being tested could search and locate. The provincial 
military quality-assurance teams also scanned the area with 
their own instruments and could find nothing remaining, so it 
was deemed as “meeting or exceeding the national standards.” 
Fortunately, the project included mechanical-assistance sup-
port to excavate the signals located at these nationally-specified 
depths, as this would have been manually impossible. Almost 
400 items were located with an average depth of 1.25 m. (4 ft.).
Figure 2. Extract from CONWEP overlaid onto CAD diagrams of Vung Ha clearance site 
showing requirements for a detonation breaking the surface of the topsoil following fill-
ing for development.
Figure 3. Contamination overview, Vung 
Ha clearance site, south portion.
Figure 4. (top) Extract from CONWEP overlaid onto CAD diagrams of Ai Tu clearance site (partial). Depicts blast limitation of MK-81 250 
and MK-82 500-pound bombs under surface layer of a hill. Figure 5. (bottom) Extract from CONWEP overlaid onto CAD diagrams of Ai 
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From an operational perspective, 
the task site could have been complet-
ed faster, less expensively and with the 
same degree of safety for the end user, if 
the correct planning approach and risk-
management system was applied.
Aging of Landmines/UXO
Another factor to consider is the ef-
fects of aging on munitions. The ag-
ing effects on landmines and UXO 
have been studied, showing that some 
items will render themselves useless 
over time, but not all of them will fol-
low this pattern.1 The physical state of 
subsurface munitions will vary great-
ly depending on the design and mate-
rials used, along with the munitions’ 
exposure to geological and weathering 
conditions. Items made from poor ma-
terials placed close to the surface can 
deteriorate to the point of becoming 
non-functional over the course of a few 
years. Some of the Chinese-made land-
mines and U.S.-made cluster munitions 
such as the BLU-26 can come apart in 
10–20 years when placed in flood zones 
or extreme environments. However, 
the Yugoslavian PROM series bound-
ing mines or the urethane-coated U.S. 
BLU-61 cluster munition will remain 
functional for much longer due to bet-
ter design and materials. 
Examples of the BLU-26 and BLU-
61 are shown in Images 1 and 2 above. 
Both were dropped on Vietnam around 
the same period and were found in simi-
lar environments. The BLU-26 fuze was 
completely nonfunctional upon clos-
er examination, but the BLU-61 was 
in perfect condition. Both items were 
found at a depth where they presented 
no surface hazard. 
Aside from the munition design, the 
position in the soil has a direct effect on 
the functionality of the munitions. For 
our purposes, the soil structure can be 
divided into oxidizing and non-oxidiz-
ing layers. This is the amount of oxygen 
available to help the materials corrode 
or deteriorate. Items such as the BLU-26 
with exposed ferrous metal components 
positioned in the oxidizing layer will 
deteriorate at a faster pace than those 
in a non-oxidizing layer. However, if the 
same item managed to penetrate into 
the non-oxidizing layer of the soil, it can 
stay fully operational for many decades.
Indisputable Facts
Post-war minefields close to the pop-
ulation always lead to loss of limbs and 
lives. Anti-tank mines buried in critical 
roadways can kill many people on a bus 
in a single blast. A surface UXO visible to 
a child can be mistaken for a toy, and it 
will kill them and their friends when they 
decide to see if it really does go boom like 
the mine-risk education people said. 
The demining and explosive ord-
nance disposal teams working in these 
situations carry out duties that directly 
prevent the loss of life and improve pub-
lic safety. Clearance teams working in 
support of economic development tasks 
help to save lives and create jobs that will 
improve the overall livelihood of those 
in underdeveloped areas. These tasks de-
serve the most focus from international 
humanitarian donor funding. 
Worldwide donor funding is in 
very short supply, and it affects all of 
us in this profession. The policies driv-
ing national and international goals 
should be readdressed to ensure that 
they are reasonable and that the lim-
ited funds available are maximized to 
save lives and support the recovery of 
post-conf lict environments.
see endnotes page 80
Image 1 (left). U.S. BLU-26 submunition remains found at 55 cm. during Vung Ha clearance. Image 2 (middle). U.S. BLU-61 submuni-
tion found in deep search excavation spoils during Vung Ha clearance. Image 3 (right). U.S. 105-mm projectile with T-227E2 variable time 
fuze located at 1.5 m. deep in non-oxidizing layer, at Vung Ha clearance site.
Roger Hess has spent more than 30 
years in the demining/EOD field. He 
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mercial clearance operations in Africa, 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
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Survivor Heroes Heal Lives and  
   Landscapes Throughout the World
by Ken Rutherford, Ph.D. [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]  
Landmine and traumatic-accident victims and their families face numerous recovery obstacles in any 
setting, but in a post-conflict setting resources may be scarce. Victims must deal with emotional and 
psychological trauma, often for years after the event. These challenges range from physical limitations 
and psychological aftermath to the economic impact on their livelihoods. Some victims take their trau-
matic experience—one in which the victim is terrified, afraid for him or herself as well as for others, 
temporarily helpless, humiliated, and isolated—and apply them to assisting other victims through ac-
tivism and support.  
In war-ravaged countries and post-conflict regions, most landmine amputees struggle simply to survive. Vic-tims often experience extended separations from family 
members, decreased employment opportunities and shifting 
demands. For someone missing arms or legs, tasks that were 
once easy to complete can become Herculean chores. This of-
ten leaves survivors and their families to face harrowing expe-
riences and uncertain futures. Survivors may also experience 
psychological and cognitive damage following the accident, 
leaving them at risk for mental health problems, family dif-
ficulties and unemployment. Many can no longer find work 
and cannot afford to buy crutches, wheelchairs and/or artifi-
cial limbs. Survivors are often ostracized and are denied prop-
er medical care. One thing is clear: most landmine survivors 
rarely return to normal lives.
Despite these discouraging obstacles, some victims have 
become survivor champions on their way to becoming leaders 
and productive community members by devoting their lives 
to helping other victims.1 They are committed to expand-
ing the solid foundations of peer support by helping others 
build resilience and understanding through conversation and 
problem-solving.2 They provide practical instruction with 
care and compassion to thousands of survivors of landmines, 
trauma and war-related violence. Survivors’ peer skills are in 
many cases essential in helping other survivors recover. In ad-
dition to counseling, outreach workers help survivors obtain 
training, benefits and healthcare through local service pro-
viders. In the most extensive study of landmine/unexploded-
ordnance survivors ever conducted, survivors in six countries 
reported significantly improved perceptions of their own 
mental and physical health following 12 months of peer sup-
port provided by trained outreach workers.3
As a token of appreciation for their leadership, I would like 
to highlight four of these unique and special survivor heroes—
Adnan Al Aboudi (Jordan), Bekele Gonfa (Ethiopia), Jesús 
Martínez (El Salvador) and Nguyen Thi Kim Hoa (Vietnam). 
I have particularly selected them from among the hundreds of 
survivors I have met over the last two decades of victim-assis-
tance work in many countries. Their leadership and capability 
in providing survivors with the direction to achieve their per-
sonal goals have helped—and continue to help—other victims 
and survivors develop their own personal strengths. Let me 
introduce them to you.
Bekele Gonfa, Ethiopia
Born the second son of a farming family in rural Ethiopia, 
Bekele Gonfa distinguished himself in school and at the Harar 
Military Academy. While serving in the Ethiopian Armed Forc-
es, he fell victim to a landmine explosion in the town of Qore 
in central Ethiopia. His left leg required amputation and his 
painful rehabilitation took 11 months.
Gonfa enrolled in Addis Ababa University when he was re-
leased from the hospital. Access to facilities was difficult for 
Gonfa, who was still adjusting to life as a landmine survivor 
when he began attending the university. Besides getting into 
the library and other buildings, he had difficulty traveling be-
tween classes within the allotted time. Despite the added ob-
stacles, he obtained a Bachelor of Science in statistics.
Gonfa became Director of Landmine Survivors Network 
(later renamed Survivor Corps) in Ethiopia in 2003, a posi-
tion he held until 2009, when Survivor Corps closed. He tire-
lessly worked to assist the rehabilitation of survivors, families 
and entire communities throughout Ethiopia. He developed 
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